Sunday, February 15, 2009

5.1.2.3 Hume

For David Hume, the ultimate entities comprising the universe are loosely related, mostly separate objects with a real external existence. Basically agreeing with Descartes, if the mind only knows its own states, then those are all it can know. Because of this limitation, we cannot reliably infer the existence of any external objects at all. We can see the color and form of external objects, but not their “noumena” (the things-in-themselves).

So far, it doesn’t look like Hume is any great supporter of a materialist or realist view of the universe. Why are we enlisting Hume as a champion of Reality? Although this may seem like he is a denier, this position actually helped the advancement of science tremendously, in that it inspired an attitude and practice of empiricism – not assuming causes through armchair Rationalist deduction as had been the fashion, but by looking for clues of found in actual events.

Hume’s philosophy involved the existence of mental “impressions” and “ideas”. Impressions are actual vivid perceptions which bring with them conviction or positive belief in the existence of a corresponding objective reality. “Ideas” are derived from impressions, and hence are less vivid than the latter. They are copies that the impressions leave behind. Hume distinguished between the act of seeing his surroundings - the tapestry in the room where he was sitting and the objects on his table - and recalling those images from that perception and to contemplate the idea of those images. In Hume’s theory of mental processes, ideas are naturally linked together and tend to call each other up to form group associations. Ideas are naturally associated with one another and form larger groups, and those groups in turn are related, to form still larger groups.

He believed that behind these groups of ideas there was a reality which corresponded to them – that the ideas actually denoted real entities, and that those physical objects were governed by the same natural laws that controlled the world of ideas. However, that world could not be deduced by reason. All we have are a series of fleeting impressions which our senses have perceived, and which have some representation in our minds. We form ideas around them. Our physical and psychological nature weaves these impressions and ideas together into an internal experience of a continuous, coherent, constant external world. We believe in an external world through habit, custom, and convenience. This helps us tie together what would otherwise be a jumble of unconnected, changing impressions. An external world is the most plausible explanation for these impressions, but not a logical certainty.

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